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Abstract
Collective signaling for a quorum is found in a wide range of organisms that face collective
action problems whose successful solution requires the participation of some quorum of the
individuals present. These range from humans, to social insects, to bacteria. The mecha-
nisms involved, the quorum required, and the size of the group may vary. Here we address
the general question of the evolution of collective signaling at a high level of abstraction. We
investigate the evolutionary dynamics of a population engaging in a signaling N-person
game theoretic model. Parameter settings allow for loners and cheaters, and for costly or
costless signals. We find a rich dynamics, showing how natural selection, operating on a
population of individuals endowed with the simplest strategies, is able to evolve a costly
signaling system that allows individuals to respond appropriately to different states of
Nature. Signaling robustly promotes cooperative collective action, in particular when
coordinated action is most needed and difficult to achieve. Two different signaling systems
may emerge depending on Nature’s most prevalent states.
Author Summary
From humans to social insects and bacteria, decision-making is often influenced by some
form of collective signaling, be it quorum, information exchange, pledges or announce-
ments. Here we investigate how such signaling systems evolve when collective action en-
tails a public good, and how meanings co-evolve with individual choices, given Nature’s
most prevalent states. We find a rich scenario, showing how natural selection is able to
evolve a costly quorum signaling system that allows individuals to coordinate their action
so as to provide the appropriate response to different states of Nature. We show that sig-
naling robustly and selectively promotes cooperative collective action when coordinated
action is most needed. In light of our results, and despite the complexity that collective
action relying on quorum signaling may entail, it is not so surprising how signaling is a
ubiquitous property of the living world.
PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004101 February 23, 2015 1 / 12
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Pacheco JM, Vasconcelos VV, Santos FC,
Skyrms B (2015) Co-evolutionary Dynamics of
Collective Action with Signaling for a Quorum. PLoS
Comput Biol 11(2): e1004101. doi:10.1371/journal.
pcbi.1004101
Editor: Carl T. Bergstrom, University of Washington,
UNITED STATES
Received: October 15, 2014
Accepted: December 19, 2014
Published: February 23, 2015
Copyright: © 2015 Pacheco et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Funding: This research was supported by FEDER
through POFC – COMPETE, FCT-Portugal through
grants SFRH/BD/86465/2012, PTDC/MAT/122897/
2010, EXPL/EEI-SII/2556/2013, and by multi-annual
funding of CMAF-UL, CBMA-UM and INESC-ID
(under the projects PEst-OE/BIA/UI4050/2014 and
UID/CEC/50021/2013) provided by FCT-Portugal,
and by Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian through the
“Stimulus to Research” program for young
researchers. The funders had no role in study design,
Introduction
Animal collectives are known to exhibit a significant diversity of decision-making systems,
most of which require some form of counting [1–6]. This information is gathered by means of
individuals’ sensory apparatus, typically subjected to a variety of confounding factors, such as
environmental noise (even in the form of deceitful information). These factors can be counter-
acted, in some cases, by resorting to additional social information. Such instantiations of collec-
tive action, which accrue to individuals of species exhibiting a huge variety of sensory and
social hardware [7], require a high level of abstraction whenever one wants to address them in
a unified way. Here we shall address the general question of how did individuals evolve mecha-
nisms that allow them to convey a meaning to external (environmental and/or social) informa-
tion in order to perform adequately as a collective. Thus, from bacteria to Humans, we shall
assume that groups of individuals may face the following ubiquitous collective action problem:
(i) a certain proportion, but not necessarily all, of the group must participate in order to pro-
duce a common good; (ii) participation has a cost, so participating in an unsuccessful project
entails a new loss; (iii) the problem is sometimes present and sometimes absent. If the common
good is successfully created but some did not contribute to its creation, there are two possibili-
ties: the shirkers may either share the benefits (acting as cheaters or defectors) or be excluded
(loners).
Species that face such problems are well-served by a signaling system that indicates whether
(i) the collective action problem is present and (ii) there will be enough participants to success-
fully produce the common good (quorum sensing). Even in the simplest organisms [8–22] it
has been recently found that quorum signaling systems are ubiquitous, revealing the existence
of sophisticated information exchange mechanisms by which simple organisms reach consen-
sus involving different numbers of participants with varying costs and benefits resulting from
initiating collective action. Despite these differences in detail, at a high level of abstraction, the
essentials can be captured in a signaling N-person game theoretic model.
We provide such a model and analyze the evolutionary dynamics of a population of individ-
uals. Parameter settings allow for loners and cheaters, and allow for costly or costless signals.
We find a rich dynamics, with surprising differences from what might be expected by equilibri-
um stability [23] analysis. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and
shirkers, and in all cases show how natural selection, operating on a population of individuals
endowed with the simplest strategies, is able to evolve a signaling system that mimics what is
observed in nature. We find that signaling generally and robustly promotes cooperative collec-
tive action, even when shirkers act as cheaters and even when signaling strategies are rare, since
they protect cooperation by forming a barrier against the invasion of cheaters.
We shall assume that Nature may choose between two different states, representing both
adverse (state α) and favorable (state β) conditions for a group of individuals, allowing for
(minimal) environmental variation. We assume that state α occurs with probability λ whereas
β occurs with probability 1-λ. Examples of this sort abound across species. Among humans,
groups of individuals may recognize that one of the states of Nature requires collective cooper-
ative action (say, under the new threat of global warming), as opposed to the other, where
collective cooperative action may be dispensed. By observing the state of Nature, an individual
may provide cues of some sort (signals, in the form of visual cues, pledges or announcements),
being possible that individuals signal differently (or not) the different states of Nature. The
aggregated information will influence the collective outcome of the group [3,16,24–28]. For
certain bacterial micro-organisms, the two states of Nature considered can be associated with
Starvation (α) and Abundance (β). Under Abundance (small values of λ), bacteria typically opt
for reproducing individually, in which case no collective action is required. Under Starvation
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(large values of λ), cooperation may become necessary for survival; cooperation is costly, but
collective action entails a public good [14].
Results/Discussion
Most models considered to date generally assume that a signaling system exists and performs the
right function [12,15,29–37]. In this work, we are mostly interested in answering the question:
How does a signaling system evolve, and under which conditions? Consequently, we assign no
a priorimeaning to the signals σ. Each individual adopts a strategy of the form (σα σβ | A0 A1),
where σα is the signal emitted by the individual when Nature chooses α and σβ the signal emitted
under β. We assume the simplest scenario of two signals (σ = 0 and σ = 1) such that σ = 0 is cost-
less—and may be associated with the absence of a signal—whereas signal σ = 1 implies a cost (cS)
to the emitter. Individuals interact in groups facing aN-person coordination dilemma [38], a
public goods problem in which a coordination threshold (M) less or equal than the total group
size (N) is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing pro-
ductivity (see Methods). Individuals may react differently depending on the signal adopted by
the majority: We shall adopt a majority rule here, without loss of generality; indeed, any other
form of counting or quorum sensingmay replace the majority rule adopted here. The values of
Ai encode the behavior of the individual when the majority adopts signal “0” (A0) and signal “1”
(A1). Whenever Ai = 1 individuals opt for Cooperation (C); if Ai = 0 individuals refuse to do so,
acting as shirkers. Shirkers are either Defectors (Ds), in which case they forego the cost while en-
joying a share of the public good, or Loners (Ls), abstaining from contributing to the public good
and foregoing the benefits from collective action. Irrespective of whether the competition is be-
tween Cs andDs or between Cs and Ls, we show (see S1 Text) how the present model provides
the expected solutions in the two extreme cases, where no environmental variation occurs: i)
When Nature only chooses α (λ = 1.0) or ii) when Nature only chooses β (λ = 0.0).
In the former case, collective action entails a public good, and the group would be better off
by cooperating. However, given that a minimum number of contributionsMN is needed to
secure a collective benefit, there is always an incentive to free ride, both because cooperators
may pay a cost in vain and also because free-riding may also entail a benefit for defectors at no
cost [38]. If individuals cooperate, and given that they never experience β, the best case scenario
will translate into cooperation in the absence of any (costly) signal. In other words, the best
case scenario corresponds to the population spending all of its time in configurations of the
type (0|1), where the placeholder “”means here any value. Indeed, in S1 Text we show that,
for λ = 1.0, the strategies (00|10), (00|11), (01|10) and (01|11) take 25% of the total time each.
Whenever Nature only chooses β (λ = 0.0), given the alternatives of emitting a costly signal
(signal 1) or emitting no signal (signal 0), and given the fact that collective action is of no use in
this case, individuals will be better off emitting no signal. For the same reason, they should
defect under majority of “signal 0”. In these conditions, what they do under “signal 1” should
be irrelevant, given the fact that selection cannot operate on this particular aspect of individu-
als’ strategy. In other words, the best case scenario corresponds to the population spending all
of its time in configurations of the type (0|0). The results shown in S1 Text fully corroborate
this picture.
In the general case (0< λ< 1), if a signaling system evolves and is at work, the fact that one
of the signals is costly means that individuals should employ their portfolio of signals to find a
means of discriminating between the states of Nature α and β. This naturally requires that
meanings co-evolve with the emergence of a signaling system. Strategies that correspond to
such signaling systems are therefore strategies (10|01) and (01|10).
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The former corresponds to situations in which the costly signal (“1”) is used to signal the
need for cooperation under α, leading to a cooperative reaction from players that respond
cooperatively to a majority of such signals. In latter case, the cheaper signal (“0”) is the one
used to effect cooperation.
Our results show that, irrespective of the values of 0<λ<1 and game parameters chosen, at
least one of these two signaling strategies prevails in the population, with a larger predomi-
nance of strategy (10|01), in which costly signals are used in situations where cooperation is re-
quired. As an example, in Fig. 1 (lower panels) we show the prevalence of strategy (10|01)—
that is, the fraction of time the population spends in a configuration in which all individuals
adopt such signaling strategy—as a function of a) selection pressure γ and the cost of signaling
cS; b) cost of cooperation c and cS c) probability λ of Nature choosing α and cS. These results
(see also figures below) were obtained when shirkers act as Defectors, but analogous results are
naturally obtained when shirkers act as Loners (see S1 Text for details). Indeed, since Loners,
Fig 1. Evolutionary robustness and Prevalence of signaling strategy (10|01). The top contour plots indicate the regions of model parameters in which
the signaling strategy (10|01) is Evolutionary Robust (ERS) (bright areas). To this end we vary the selection pressure γ and the cost of signaling cS (left
panel); the cost of cooperation c and cS (center panel) and the probability that Nature chooses α (λ) and cS. The bottom panels show, for the same
parameter space, the prevalence of the population in a configuration in which all individuals adopt the signaling strategy (10|01). The remaining parameters
(and also those plotted whenever not varied) are Z = 100,N = 9,M = 5, c = 0.5, γ = 5, F = 10, λ = 0.5. A signaling system emerges for a wide range of values
of the model parameters. Comparison of top and bottom panels shows the existence of parameter regions in which (10|01) is an ERS and yet the population
almost never adopts this strategy and, conversely, there are regions in which (10|01) is not an ERS and yet the population spends approximately 30% of its
time in configuration comprising only this strategy (see main text for details). Note, in particular, that signaling systems emerge more robustly under strong
selection, a scenario that is very likely to occur in many cases under α conditions (those that entail a public good). Moreover, for some species the
enhancement factor F = 10 possibly constitutes an underestimate given that, under α, survival may be at stake (as is the case in, e.g., many bacterial
species), and successful cooperation likely leads to higher benefits. Nonetheless, a signaling system emerges for a wide range of values of λ, provided that
cS< c/2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004101.g001
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like cheaters, abstain from contributing to the public good but, unlike cheaters, forego the ben-
efits from collective action, the disadvantage of cooperators is less pronounced in this case,
which facilitates the emergence of collective signaling.
Clearly, this signaling system manages to emerge for a wide range of values of the model pa-
rameters; it is noteworthy that it also emerges more robustly under strong selection (large γ), a
scenario that is very likely to occur under the state of Nature α. Moreover, for this strategy to
dominate, the cost of signaling must be smaller than the cost of cooperation (here cS< c/2), in
agreement with what is known from the empirical literature [39].
We may also compute the set of Evolutionary Robust Strategies (ERS) [40,41], defined as
strategies for which natural selection opposes the fixation of a mutant adopting any other strat-
egy (see Methods for details). In particular, comparison between the lower and upper panels of
Fig. 1, where we display the regions of parameter space where the strategy (10|01) is an ERS,
shows that being robust against fixation does not necessarily warrant a high prevalence of this
strategy in the population. Indeed, we find regions where (10|01) is an ERS with 0% prevalence
and regions where it is not an ERS and, despite this fact, its prevalence can be significant
among all 16 possible strategies (see below). We find similar predictions with other stability or
robustness measures (see Methods).
As one approaches the regions where the signaling strategy (10|01) no longer takes over the
entire population, it is illuminating to analyze in more detail the profile of the stationary distri-
bution, in particular when the probability (λ) of an unfavorable state of nature (state α) is sig-
nificant. This is shown in Fig. 2 for a representative case where both signaling strategies
remain, overall, the most prevalent, despite no longer taking 100% of the time. The bar plot in
Fig. 2A depicts the prevalence of each strategy in situations in which Nature chooses α with
probability λ = 0.8.
In Fig. 2B and C we plot directed graphs in which each node corresponds to one of the
16 possible monomorphic states and respective strategies. The links (represented by arrows
pointing from strategy V to strategy U) indicate those transitions favored by natural selection,
i.e., those elements of the transition matrix T (see Methods) for which ρV,U> ρN 1 / Z. In
Fig 2. Dynamics. A) The bar plot shows the fraction of time the population spends in eachmonomorphic configuration of every strategy (σα σβ | A0 A1) (see
main text for details).B) The graph represents all strategies, one at each node, with edges representing transitions between strategies above neutral drift. For
the parameter values chosen (Z = 100,N = 9,M = 5, c = 0.3, cs = 0.06, γ = 0.5, F = 10, λ = 0.8), no strategy is Evolutionary Robust (ERS).C)We show the graph
resulting from studying the dynamics in the subspace of strategies including the 4 most abundant inA, highlighting a 3 strategy loop which often occurs for large
values of λ. When the state of Nature α occurs more often than β (here λ = 0.8), (10|01) can be invaded by its complementary discriminative strategy—(01|10)—
benefiting from cheaper signals to achieve the same goal of coordinating collective action. (01|10), in turn, can be invaded by (00|10), thus saving the cost of
signaling under B. This, in turn, can be invaded again by (10|01) closing a loop in probability space that precludes the emergence of any ERS. Note further, that
despite not being the most prevalent strategy, (10|01) plays a crucial role, as it is the only one of those strategies in the loop that can invade (00|00).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004101.g002
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other words, we show the paths along which mutants of a strategy located at the end of a link
are advantageous regarding invasion of a population of individuals adopting the strategy
corresponding to the origin of the link. Those strategies corresponding to nodes without outgo-
ing links are, by definition, ERS thus rendering a robustness analysis, in principle, a trivial
visual exercise.
Fig. 2 shows that whenever Nature predominantly chooses α, as it is the case, the comple-
mentary signaling strategy, (01|10)—a discriminative strategy in which individuals react coop-
eratively in the absence of a costly signal, and defect whenever a costly signal is present—may
also emerge and, in some cases, prevail. In other words, individuals may resort to a collective
analog of a cheaper signaling system (involving a secret, yet collective, handshake [8,9]) to
coordinate in case of α (most abundant scenario), whereas in case of β they will employ the
costly signal “1”. In this way, costly signals are used much less than whenever individuals coor-
dinate into (10|01). Nonetheless, this strategy is rarely an ERS, as it is often invaded by other
strategies, contrary to (10|01) which is robust against invasion in most of the parameter space
(see Fig. 2), even when it does not emerge as the most frequent strategy. In fact, in many
situations, none of the signaling strategies (or any other) is an ERS, as exemplified in Fig. 2,
which fosters endless evolutionary cycles of invasion and fixation.
The loop shown in Fig. 2C provides a clear intuitive explanation for this fact, showing the
transitions that link the four most abundant strategies in this scenario and which, as the bar
plot in Fig. 2A shows, include the two signaling strategies. Clearly, when α occurs more often
than β (here λ = 0.8), (10|01) can be invaded by its complementary discriminative strategy—
(01|10)—benefiting from cheaper signals to achieve the same goal of coordinating collective
action. Strategy (01|10), in turn, can be invaded by (00|10), thus saving the cost of signaling
under α. This, in turn, can be invaded again by (10|01) closing a loop in probability space that
precludes the emergence of any ERS. Importantly, and despite not being the most prevalent
strategy, (10|01) plays a crucial role, as it is the only one of those strategies in the loop that can
invade (00|00).
The absence of robust strategies may naturally depend on the cost of signaling. As we
decrease the ratio cS/c, there will be a critical value below which both signaling strategies may
become ERS with comparable frequencies, showing that the path to the emergence of a
signaling system is not unique.
Moreover, the dynamical scenario discussed above remains robust for a wide interval of
mutation probabilities (μ<1/Z2) and for the entire range of possible thresholdsM required for
cooperation to be effective, showing how the signaling systems discussed here are able to
secure the necessary coordination needed to achieve a collective benefit, irrespectively of how
stringent such conditions are. Indeed, whenever one increases the number of contributions
needed to produce a public good (M), evolution leads to a higher prevalence of signaling strate-
gies, which in turn leads to greater levels of cooperation. Thus, it is as if necessity becomes the
mother of invention, as signaling strategies get selected in those situations in which coordinat-
ing into collective action is harder to achieve. Additionally, it is important to note that the
group size may also play a determinant role in the tendency to cooperate in public goods di-
lemmas. As shown in [38] for this particular N-person coordination dilemma, as the group size
(N) approaches the population size (Z), we may transform a coordination dynamics character-
ized by two basins of attraction, into a transformed dynamics in which defectors are always
advantageous. Thus, by increasing the group size, we foster a stricter dilemma for strategies
that cooperate, independently of their signaling choices. The impact of these two variables—
the thresholdM and group size N—is shown in Fig. 3 where we plot the frequency of signaling
strategies—i.e., strategies (01|10) and (10|01) as a function of the ratioM/N and different
group sizes.
Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action with Quorum Signaling
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In this manuscript we have shown that collective signaling and quorum sensing strategies
which are sensitive to the majority signal emerge naturally and are robust, allowing populations
to coordinate and act appropriately to the externalities imposed by Nature. We have shown
that the relevance of these signaling strategies cannot be overlooked, as even when they are not
the most abundant in the population, they provide evolutionary barriers that prevent shirkers
from dominating in conditions that, in some cases, may put the group survival at jeopardy.
This happens even in settings in which response implies producing a public good from which
shirkers benefit at no cost. Clearly, the emergence of a signaling system is facilitated when
shirking does not translate into cheating but, instead, into abstaining from participating in
collective action (see S1 Text). Moreover, whenever harsh conditions become most frequent,
evolution selects for a complementary and, arguably, more efficient signaling strategy, in which
the absence of signal is used as a costless signal used to foster collective action. Thus, two differ-
ent signaling systems may emerge depending on the Nature’s most prevalent states.
Another limit that is interesting and simplifies the discussion (see S1 Text for additional de-
tails) occurs whenever we assume, from the outset, that individuals are constrained to achieve
quorum solely in the presence of one particular (costly) signal. If individuals will always defect
in the absence of signals, then our strategy space is reduced to 8 instead of the 16-strategy space
explored so-far. In this case, the signaling strategy remains always an ESR irrespectively of the
value of 0<λ<1. Needless to say, whenever Nature’s β states are most frequent, prevalence of
signaling may be largely reduced, as shown explicitly in S1 Text. In other words, signaling strat-
egies emerge when collective action is most needed.
Overall, and despite the complexity that collective action relying on quorum signaling may
entail, our results clearly show how reliable, robust, and evolutionary viable it is to evolve a sig-
naling system. As a result, it is perhaps no longer so surprising how signaling is a ubiquitous
property of the living world.
Fig 3. Prevalence of signaling strategies (10|01) and (01|10).We consider three different group sizes, N = 9 (gray bars), N = 18 (blue bars) andN = 27
(black bars), and different values of the coordination thresholdM. Signaling strategies prevail in those situations in which coordination is harder to achieve
(largeM). Furthermore, larger groups must be subjected to stronger requirements such that signaling emerges and the public good is achieved. Other
parameters: Z = 100, c = 0.5, cs = 0.2, γ = 2, F = 10, λ = 0.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004101.g003
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Methods
Signaling Games
Following [38,42–45], we set up a N-person signaling game to describe the scenarios advanced
before. We assume that Nature can choose between two states, α (with probability λ) and β
(with probability 1 – λ). We assume there exist at most two signals σ = {0,1} (σ = 0 may also be
associated with a no-signal), such that all individuals emit either signal σ = 0 or signal σ = 1. Sig-
nals have, a priori, no pre-defined meaning, and they may entail a differential cost, say, σ = 1
involves an additional cost cS compared to σ = 0, which will have a direct impact in the fitness
of individuals emitting such signal. We shall assume the simplest repertoire of strategies con-
cerning the signaling process, that is, individuals act based on the most frequent signal present
in the group (flipping a coin in case of a tie). We designate this simple set of strategies by
quorum sensing strategies.
Population Dynamics
Let us consider a finite (but of otherwise arbitrary size) well-mixed population of Z interacting
individuals and assume they reproduce via a birth-death process, implemented here by means
of a stochastic update rule [46–49]. At each time step an individual i with strategy Si and fitness
Oi (obtained in terms of the game payoffPi defined below) will be eventually replaced with
probability p by another random individual j adopting a strategy Sj (with fitness Oj). The prob-
ability p increases with the increase in fitness difference between j and i [48,49], and may be
conveniently written in terms of the so-called Fermi distribution (from statistical physics)
p ¼ ½1þ eg½OjðkÞOiðkÞ1, in which γ (an inverse temperature in physics) translates here into
stochastic errors in the replacement process [48], ultimately defining the intensity of natural
selection in the population dynamics: High values of γ correspond to very strong selection,
whereas for γ! 0, selection becomes so weak that evolution proceeds by random drift.
We define an individual strategy Si as a vector of the form Si ¼ ðsa; sb j A0;A1Þ, where σα
(σβ) is the signal emitted by an individual when Nature chooses α (β), and A0 (A1) is the action
that the individual takes when the majority signal in the group is 0 (1) respectively. The action
to a majority signal may be viewed as the simplest possible strategy compatible with quorum
sensing—simply act in accordance with the stronger signal. This creates an overall set of nS =
24 = 16 different strategies, given that we shall consider 2 possibilities of action for each case
(see below). One action determines the individual to cooperate (C) in a Public Goods Game
(PGG) by contributing a cost c to the public good. In line with the game defined in [38], a bene-
fit b> c will be produced to the extent that at leastM (where 0<M N) individuals contrib-
ute to the PGG. We assume the parameterization introduced in [38] and write b = Fkc/N, with
k the number of cooperators in the group, and the multiplication factor F 0 a real number
which will allow us to describe a variety of scenarios commonly observed in nature. For this
game, and unlike the more popular N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which unconditional
cooperators dominate unconditional defectors whenever F>N, here even in this case uncondi-
tional cooperators face a coordination problem when co-evolving with unconditional defectors
[38]. We shall study the evolutionary competition between cooperators and shirkers. The latter
behavior will reflect two different possibilities: in some cases we associate the shirker with a
conventional defector (D, or cheater), in which case he foregoes the cost while reaping a share of
the public good (as long as there are enough cooperators in the group); in other cases, the shirker
behaves as a loner (L) (see S1 Text) abstaining from contributing to the PGG, but also abstaining
from reaping the benefits resulting from successful collective action. In summary, when under α,
a shirker who behaves as a defector in a group with k cooperators getsPDðkÞ ¼ FkcN yðkMÞ
Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action with Quorum Signaling
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(where the Heaviside step function θ(x) satisfies θ(x< 0) = 0 and θ(x 0) = 1); a shirker who be-
haves as a loner will get 0, whereas a cooperator will getPC(k) =PD(k)–c, when playing against
Ds andPC(k) = Fcθ(k –M) – c, when playing against Ls. If nature chooses β, the same payoff ex-
pressions apply, but now with F = 0.
Assuming a well-mixed population, individuals assemble into groups of size N, and benefits
will accrue to those who cooperate or defect every time a group contains a number cooperators
exceeding the thresholdM. Fitness is, thus, associated with the expected payoff respectively by
OCðkÞ ¼
Z  1
N  1
 !1XN1
j¼0
k 1
j
 !
Z  k
N  j 1
 !
PCðjþ 1Þ
and
OD;LðkÞ ¼
Z  1
N  1
 !1XN1
j¼0
k
j
 !
Z  k 1
N  j 1
 !
PD;LðjÞ
Besides reproduction events, we further assume that with a probability μ individuals may
mutate to a randomly chosen strategy, freely exploring the space of nS possible strategies.
Small Mutation Approximation
A full analysis of the entire configuration space is unfeasible. Hence we adopt the limit μ!0
(so-called small-mutation limit) [50,51] in which case the analysis of the 16-strategy space
becomes tractable. In the absence of mutations, the end states of evolution are inevitably
monomorphic, as a result of the stochastic nature of the evolutionary dynamics and update
rule. By introducing a small probability of mutation, every time a new mutant appears, the
population will either end up wiping out the mutant or witness the fixation of the intruder.
Hence, in the small-mutation limit, the mutant will fixate or will become extinct before the
occurrence of another mutation and, for this reason, the population will spend all of its time
with a maximum of two strategies present simultaneously. This allows one to describe the
evolutionary dynamics of our population in terms of a reduced (and embedded) Markov
Chain of size nS [50,51], where each state represents a possible monomorphic end-state of
the population associated with a given strategy, and the transitions between states are defined
by the fixation probabilities of a single mutant of one strategy in a population of individuals
who adopt another strategy. The resulting stationary distribution characterizes the average
time the population spends in each of these monomorphic states, and can be computed ana-
lytically (see below).
Stationary Distribution
Given the above assumptions, it is now possible to write down the probability to change the
number k of individuals with a strategy U (by plus or minus one in each time step) in a popula-
tion with Z–k V-strategists: TðkÞ ¼ Zk
Z
k
Z1 ½1þ e∓g½OUðkÞOVðkÞ1 [48]. This can be used to com-
pute the fixation probability of a mutant with a strategy U in a population with Z-1 Vs, given
by rV ;U ¼
PZ1
i¼0
Qi
j¼1
j
1
, where i ¼ T
ðiÞ
TþðiÞ [23,48,52,53]. In the limit of neutral selection (γ!
0), ϕi becomes independent of the fitness values: ρV,U = 1/Z [46,48]. Considering a set {1,...,nS}
of different strategies, the fixation probabilities define n2s transition probabilities of the reduced
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Markov chain, with the associated transition matrix
T ¼
1 Zðr1;2 þ 	 	 	 þ r1;nSÞ Zr1;2 	 	 	 Zr1;nS
Zr2;1 1 Zðr2;1 þ 	 	 	 þ r1;nSÞ 	 	 	 Zr2;nS
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ZrnS ;1 	 	 	 	 	 	 1 ZðrnS ;1 þ 	 	 	 þ rnS ;nS1Þ
2
66664
3
77775
ð1Þ
where η = (ns–1)
–1 provides the appropriate normalization factor. The normalized eigenvector
associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transpose of T provides the stationary distribution de-
scribed before [50,51]. It is also noteworthy that, as the population spends most of the time in
the vicinity of monomorphic states, the fraction of time the population spends in states in
which individuals cooperate with its own strategy also corresponds to the fraction of time the
population spends in cooperative scenarios. Consequently the stationary distribution obtained
from the matrix T provides both the relative evolutionary advantage of each strategy, and also
the stationary fraction of cooperative acts. Finally, we assume that a strategy A is evolutionary
robust (ERS) [40,41], if the ﬁxation probability of a single mutant is smaller than neutral ﬁxa-
tion, that is, 1/Z [46,48]. As shown, this measure offers limited predictive capabilities in what
concerns the long-term dynamics and prevalence of each strategy in ﬁnite populations, a fea-
ture previously discussed in various contexts (see, e.g. [45,50,54–56]). Analogous or poorer pre-
dictions are also obtained with other robustness or stability measures. If we add an additional
constraint to the above ERS condition, requiring that a single mutant of any other strategy
shows a lower ﬁtness than A, we obtain the evolutionary stability condition of Refs. [23,46].
The corresponding stability analysis would yield even worse predictions, in the sense that pa-
rameter regions in which signaling strategies would be both long-term prevalent and stable
would be reduced. Likewise, we obtain the same results shown in Fig. 1 if an evolutionary
stable strategy is deﬁned as a strategy A which, if invaded by an arbitrary mutant B with proba-
bility ρA,B>1/Z, is able to counter invade with probability ρB,A, larger than ρA,B [55]. This said,
and irrespective of the deﬁnition of evolutionary stability adopted in ﬁnite populations, the
overall dynamical picture and conclusions described here still hold, being thus independent of
the particular measures of robustness and stability considered.
Supporting Information
S1 Text. Supporting Text (containing 5 additional figures) provides additional details
concerning the methodology adopted (Section S1) and investigates i) the evolutionary dy-
namics in the limit cases when Nature only chooses A and B states (Sections S2 and S3); ii)
the evolution of cheap forms of quorum depending on Nature’s state (Section S4); iii) the
evolution of signaling strategies when individuals are constrained to achieve quorum solely
in the presence of one particular (costly) signal (Section S5); and iv) the emergence of sig-
naling in the evolutionary dynamics of Cooperators and Loners (Section S6).
(PDF)
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